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Most federal appellate judges are generalists, not intensively schooled in
economic theory and mindful of the limits to their institutional compe-
tence.' Judicial review of economic analyses is an increasingly important
task of the courts, however, particularly courts like the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that hear appeals
from the rules and rulings of regulatory agencies.' Agencies use economic
analyses for administrative decision-making in a variety of ways. They
may be required by statute to make decisions that are "economically feasi-
ble" 8 or to consider "reasonableness of cost." 4 Even when the governing
statute says nothing specific about economic principles, the agency may
rely heavily on economic analysis to meet more general statutory criteria,
such as determining that rates are "just and reasonable."5 In such cases,
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; B.A. 1948, Connect-
icut College; LL.B. 1951, Yale Law School. I wish to thank my law clerk, Bernard Black, and Laird
Hart, law clerk to Judge Abner Mikva (1981-82), for their contributions and collegiality in this
endeavor.
1. Judges are often reminded of these limits by commentators and other judges. See, e.g., Fidelity
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3030-31 (1982) ("As judges, it is neither
our function, nor within our expertise, to evaluate the economic soundness of the Board's approach.");
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1971) ("The fact is that courts are of limited
utility in examining difficult economic problems."); DeLong, The Role, if Any, of Economic Analysis
in Antitrust Litigation, 12 SW. U.L. REV. 298, 303 (1981) ("[A llowing ninety-five district courts and
eleven courts of appeal each to invent its own microeconomics would have awesome consequences.").
2. Economic analysis also pervades such diverse fields as securities, tort, contract, and antitrust
litigation. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89
YALE L.J. 1261, 1265-71, 1281-86 (1980); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of
Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960). This article, however, will focus primarily on
administrative law.
3. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n (Vermont Yankee
1I), 685 F.2d 459, 491 (D.C. Cir.) (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. §
4332 (1976), requires that effluent-release technology be "economically feasible"), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 443 (1982).
4. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 209 n.3
(D.C. Cir.) (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(3)
(1976), requires that safety standards take into consideraton "reasonableness of cost"), vacated sub
nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983); New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Blum, 678 F.2d 392, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1982) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(D) (repealed 1981), reimbursed providers for "reasonable cost" of inpatient services);
Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (29 U.S.C. § 79 4a(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1981), requires that remedies consider "the reasonableness of cost" of necessary workplace
accommodations); D.D. Bean & Sons v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 574 F.2d 643, 649 (1st Cir.
1978) (15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(2)(A) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1981)),
requires that safety regulations reduce or eliminate hazards "at a reasonable cost").
5. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act, § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1976) (transportation or sale of natural
gas); Public Utility Act of 1939, § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1976) (transmission or sale of electric
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the agency often uses economic theory to predict the consequences of a
particular action and to determine whether that action is in accord with
the statutory mandate.' In still other cases, the agency may use economic
analysis simply to find jurisdictional facts.
7
Notwithstanding the differences among these situations, they all require
judges to understand the often arcane economic issues involved in an
agency's decision. Recently, for example, the D.C. Circuit decided
whether the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) automatic cost in-
dex for incorporating cost increases into railroad rates must be adjusted to
reflect increased productivity,' whether the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) can require a utility purchasing power from a
cogeneration facility to pay a rate equal to the utility's "full avoided
cost," 9 and a host of similarly esoteric disputes.'0 To say that these eco-
energy); Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, §§ 1-8, 46 U.S.C. §§ 843-848 (1976) (intercoastal carrier
rates); Communications Act of 1934, § 201(b), 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976) (communications carrier
rates).
6. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (awarding copyright royalties to movie producers, sports teams, musical performers, and
others on basis of "marketplace value" of works transmitted); American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v.
FERC, 675 F.2d 1226, 1233 (D.C. Cir.) (FERC allocated all savings to cogenerators in order to
"provide a significant incentive for a higher growth rate of these technologies") (quoting FERC), cert.
granted sub nom. American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 206 (1982);
City of Charlottesville v. FERC, 661 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (prediction of investment strategies);
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (selection of fully distributed costs
rather than incremental costs as basis for costing methodology), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 95 Stat. 1895 (to be codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 45 & 49 U.S.C.) (ICC has jurisdiction to review reasonableness of rates charged
by "market dominant" railroads, with market dominance in a particular market determined by ratio
of rates to variable costs); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 231, at 227 (1978) (defini-
tions of "interstate commerce" under the federal antitrust statutes).
8. Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 677 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 568 (1982). The issue in Western Coal was whether the ICC's cost index reflected only inflation-
ary costs and was thus unreviewable under the Staggers Act. Petitioners argued that an appropriate
inflation index should account only for actual increases in cost per unit of output, and that the ICC's
chosen "market basket" index would allow railroads to receive unreviewable, profit-enhancing rate
increases whenever railroad productivity increased. On review, we concluded that the statute did not
prescribe a particular methodology for calculating the index, but did provide guidance as to what
factors the Commission could properly consider in selecting an index. Increasing railroad profits, we
concluded, was not a proper reason for choosing a market basket methodology. Nonetheless, we con-
cluded that the Commission had provided a sufficient pragmatic rationale for selecting the simpler
market basket methodology in its initial rule. We noted that the record failed to offer a workable
alternative that would serve the statutory purpose of allowing railroads to recover inflationary cost
increases quickly.
The critical problem in Western Coal was that petitioners offered a well-schooled economic argu-
ment but did not adequately rebut the ICC's assessment of the impracticality of putting their theory
into practice. Thus, while we agreed with petitioners that the inflation index was not designed to
enhance profits, and that the market basket index might have that effect, we could not provide them
with the relief they sought.
9. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. FERC, 675 F.2d at 1226.
10. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. FERC, 676 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (claim for monetary
compensation by natural gas distribution companies with fewer high priority customers than their
competitors, because regulation curtailed gas supplies during shortages according to customer priori-
ties); Illinois Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 670 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (challenge by municipal
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nomic issues are complex, and pose delicate problems concerning the
proper scope of judicial review, is to understate the challenges that they
present. Nor are such adjudications just a passing trend. Indeed, judging
from the pending bills on regulatory reform, it seems likely that the eco-
nomic issues confronting the courts will become even more delicate and
intricate in future years."
This article briefly reviews the problems that can impede adequate ju-
dicial review of economic decisionmaking by administrative agencies and
then provides some suggestions for appellate judges about how to ap-
proach these mixed issues of law and economics. These suggestions are
aimed at judges, but they may be profitable for litigants and agencies as
well, because they indicate the limitations as well as the strengths of eco-
nomic analyses in the appellate courts.
I. Impediments to Review
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), agency actions are
evaluated on such catch-all grounds as whether they are based on "sub-
stantial evidence" or are "arbitrary and capricious," an "abuse of discre-
tion," or "otherwise not in accordance with law."'" These legal standards
are terms of art that leave enormous room for judicial examination of the
substantive as well as the procedural aspects of agency decisionmaking. At
the same time, as the Supreme Court frequently reminds us, the reviewing
court must not substitute its policy choices for those of the agency to
which Congress has entrusted implementation of its laws.' Judges must
neither usurp the prerogatives of the other two branches nor neglect their
own office, but the line between "rubber-stamping" and "second-guess-
ing" often seems to be thin indeed.
Applying the strictures of the APA or of agency-specific statutes such as
utilities to FERC ratemaking that allegedly subjected municipalities to prohibited "price squeeze"; the
utilities claimed that they could not purchase wholesale power at rates charged by regulated suppliers
and still compete with the suppliers for retail customers); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (validity of EPA emission limits for coal-fired power plants).
11. Recently proposed "regulatory reform" bills would require that agencies engage in cost-benefit
analysis for all "major" rules and regulations. See S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. REP. No. 435, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). With certain exceptions, agencies must show that
the "benefits" of the proposed rule justify the "costs" and that the rules adopted are the most cost-
effective alternatives for achieving the objective of the rules. These proposals are discussed in part IV
infra.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (1976).
13. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (courts must "guard against
the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of
policy"); cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 549 (1978) (court should "not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural for-
mat or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or more likely to
further some vague, undefined public good").
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the Clean Air Act" to administrative cases involving economic decision-
making is therefore intellectually challenging in itself. Under any formula
of judicial review, the process of adjudication adds further impediments.
To start with, appellate courts are docket-ridden. The D.C. Circuit de-
cides over 600 merits appeals each term, along with more than 600 mo-
tions, and the time that a judge and his or her law clerks can devote to
any one case is limited. Briefs are confined by court rule to a finite num-
ber of pages, regardless of subject matter, and oral arguments are often
truncated (15 minutes per side is the norm). As a result, the period for
learning new terms and grasping new concepts is short.
Time constraints aside, appellate courts are also limited by the manner
in which the cases are presented. Department of Justice and agency law-
yers may justifiably fear that courts will not understand the economic
analysis in a particular case, but it is also a fact that these same lawyers
often fail to present such analysis coherently.1" The appellate judge, un-
like the district judge or the agency's administrative law judge, never gets
to talk directly to the economists, question the experts, or ensure that
every piece of relevant information finds its way into the record. Instead,
appellate judges have their economics filtered through both the factfinders
below and the lawyer-advocates that argue the case in court. Because the
case is argued by lawyers, the economic analysis is thrust into lawyers'
language and lawyers' principles and perceptions even when the fit is not
smooth. It is not so uncommon for an appellate panel to miss a key ele-
ment in a particular case or to misunderstand the nature of the regulated
transaction, with unhappy or even disastrous results. Ironically, by the
time such judicial misunderstandings surface in petitions for rehearing,
the litigants themselves have often changed lawyers or brought in addi-
tional counsel.1 6
Finally, once the briefing and oral argument are over, the judge is cut
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1976).
15. One commentator has stated:
[The uncertainty and lack of reality of economic analysis] frustrates lawyers, who are forced
to deal with actual problems in all their complexity, however poor the informaton, and who
find it hard to understand people who would rather work out pure models than analyze untidy
reality. This frustration leads lawyers into a profound error. Not really understanding that
economic analysis is an approach to problems of which rigorous analysis is only the paradigm,
and not really wanting to learn a new set of concepts, lawyers are easily persuaded that be-
cause economics provides few firm answers to problems they are free to ignore it entirely.
DeLong, supra note 1, at 329-30.
16. Without citing cases, I confess that this has happened to me on a few occasions. The explana-
tion of the attorneys is often better the second time around, perhaps because they can see from the
court's opinion what was or was not understood initially. One of the great virtues of the rule permit-
ting petitions for rehearing, FED. R. APP. P. 40, is that it encourages this sort of "reasoned dialogue"
between the parties and the court. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1979).
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off from further contact with the authors or interpreters of the relevant
economic analysis, no matter how complex or disputed the case.1" He or
she must rely on the written record, the insights of other members of the
panel and of law clerks,"8 and whatever available treatises or articles seem
useful. In this endeavor the pitfalls awaiting a judge may occasionally ap-
proach those encountered by the inexperienced prisoner writing a pro se
petition, liberally sprinkling it with fine-sounding quotations from ancient
decisions that may have no relevance to the case at hand. The judge's
situation may in one respect be even worse, because if the prisoner has a
discernible case, the court may appoint counsel to provide legal fortifica-
tion; no such help is in sight for the non-economist judge. There are, of
course, annual solicitations of judges to attend economic seminars that are
financed by university or corporate grants and that feature lecturers and
texts chosen by the sponsors. But many judges have no time or inclination
to attend these, and self-help attempts to become an instant expert in the
Chicago or MIT schools of economics run the risk of compounding igno-
rance rather than defeating it. Most judges cannot be expected to become
proficient in the mathematical equations of quantitative economics any
more than they can be expected to master the blueprints of complex tech-
nological mechanisms or the software programs for computers. To what
level of understanding should the judge aspire? How then should judges
governed by the limits of their skill and office approach the task of decid-
ing cases that involve complex economic analyses?
II. Initial Suggestions to Judges for Dealing With Economic Analyses
I find the most useful thing a judge can do initially in any case in
which economic analyses figure prominently is to focus on the specific
transactions or institutions that have been regulated. Tackling the special-
ized economic theories and ratemaking formulas is best postponed until
the basic facts and the basic microeconomics have been grasped. How does
a gas curtailment system actually work at the pipeline or distribution
level? What makes up a market basket cost index, and how frequently is
it revised? How are consolidated income taxes calculated? These funda-
17. I have lamented elsewhere this aspect of appellate process. See Wald, Making "Informed"
Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 153 (1982) ("[Judges
often do not discover difficulties with complex technical aspects of the case . . . until after oral argu-
ment, when they settle down to prepare an opinion," and therefore "the judges should be able to call
the parties back in, along with their experts.").
18. The law clerks have more recently completed their formal education, and are often beneficiaries
of the recent emphasis on economic analysis of legal problems that has become a staple of American
law schools. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); G. CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Many judges now look for economic as well as legal proficiency when
they hire law clerks.
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mental understandings are the sine qua non for deciding whether an
agency decision is reasonable or not. In my experience, most misguided
judicial decisions go wrong at this basic level. It is not hard to see why, for
the agency and the litigants are wont to gloss over the basic transaction or
relationships and to emphasize instead whatever economic or legal litany
is currently in vogue: rules of reason, per se violations, predatory pricing,
subsidized competition, prohibited price squeezes, market ordering, and so
on. Going behind the conclusory language and the economic as well as the
legal labels is a necessary first step to finding out what the case is really
about. This often requires tedious digging into the record, but if a judge
does not do that digging, he or she runs the risk of becoming prematurely
enmeshed in debates over arcane points of economic analysis, eventually
overwhelmed, and tempted mightily to retreat to the reductio ad ab-
surdum of agency deference, to wit, "if it is too complicated for me to
understand, the agency must be right."
The judge should approach each case involving an economic analysis by
asking, "What has to be true for this policy to make sense?" He or she
then looks to see if those facts or conditions are accounted for in the analy-
sis and, where appropriate, if their existence is documented in the record.
To the extent that oral argument allows, the judge should ask enough
questions, no matter how basic, to ensure that he or she has grasped the
transactional roots of the controversy. When pressed, however, the lawyers
themselves will often be unsure about how the process or events being
regulated are carried on, and the court may need a supplemental briefing.
Though not always satisfactory, it seldom hurts, and may help the parties
focus on and clarify areas of factual confusion.
Judges should also be prepared, however, for a few unfortunate times
when arguments are a total shambles insofar as the clarification of under-
lying complex issues and data is concerned. Agency lawyers are prone in
such situations to assure the court that the expertise lies in the agency. 9
Challengers too may prefer to obfuscate the weaknesses of their cases by
discoursing at length on the global messages of prior holdings and by
passing too swiftly over the unique facts of the present controversy. Those
are the cases most likely to result in erroneous or misguided holdings,
unless (or sometimes even if) the judge undertakes a colossal self-educa-
tion effort.
19. In one recent maritime rate case, the government's brief argued only that the agency's rate
decision should receive deference, and gave no hint of the reasons why the rate might be reasonable.
We had to refer to the briefs filed in the district court to find any semblance of any explanation, and
that explanation proved to be inconsistent with the agency's own explanation. Aeron Marine Shipping
Co. v. United Statess, 695 F.2d 567, 581-82 & n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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III. Particular Problems in Judicial Review of Economic Analyses
A. Degree of Deference
In any particular case it is necessary to identify the nature and function
of economic analysis in the relevant statutory scheme. The various statu-
tory roles that economic analyses can play have implications for the ap-
propriate level of judicial scrutiny.
1. Economic Facts
Some statutes require findings of particular economic facts as a basis for
agency jurisdiction to regulate in a particular manner, i.e., a railroad's
"market dominance" or a transaction's effect on "interstate commerce." 20
Such findings must be made by the agency or district court on the basis of
expert, and often conflicting, testimony. Here the appellate court must be
scrupulous in assuring itself that the evidence supports the factual finding
since Congress did not mean the agency to have regulatory authority at all
in the absence of such a finding. The economic expert whose views are
given the greatest credence below, in this as in other disputed areas, will
usually be a staff witness."' Although administrative law judges, agencies,
and trial courts have discretion to assess the credibility and persuasiveness
of a staff expert, an appellate court must conduct a careful review to en-
sure that substantial evidence in the record supports the jurisdictional
finding. One cannot totally ignore the circumstance that agency members
are advocates of their own long-run policies as well as adjudicators; even
administrative law judges are assigned for long periods of time to single
agencies. In the main, it seems fair to conclude that when the statute re-
quires that a particular fact be found, appellate courts may have a greater
responsibility to scrutinize the record for "substantial evidence" than they
do when Congress has expressly entrusted to the agency judgments about
what is "economically feasible" or "just and reasonable."''.
20. See supra note 7.
21. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. FMC, 678 F.2d 327, 342-43 (D.C. Cir.)
(FMC generally accepted rate-of-return calculations of expert witness from FMC's Bureau of Investi-
gation & Enforcement, and discounted expert testimony offered by petitioners), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 210 (1982), South Dakota Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. FERC, 643 F.2d 504, 510-14 (6th Cir. 1981)
(FERC staff expert's model for predicting natural gas reserves upheld despite fact that petitioners'
model predicted three times more reserves).
22. Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 20-24 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (EPA does not need to
make specific findings of harm to health before regulating lead in gasoline), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 15.03, at 296 (3d ed. 1972) (practical
difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is that agency's "findings of adjudicative facts
must be supported by evidence, but findings or assumptions of legislative facts need not be, frequently
are not, and sometimes cannot be supported by evidence"). But see Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932 (1980) (observing trend toward requiring agencies to develop facts even for
legislative rulemaking, and recognizing that issue "is difficult because legislative facts come in so many
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2. Economic Analysis Required by Statute
Where a governing statute requires the agency to conduct an economic
analysis as a basis for action, the reviewing court's responsibility is two-
pronged, and the degree of deference accorded the agency varies between
the prongs. Since the analysis is a statutory prerequisite to agency action,
the court must insist that it be done and that it include whatever compo-
nents Congress specified. Little or no deference is due the agency in such
threshold scrutiny. On the other hand, Congress has also decreed that it is
the agency, not the court, that is to perform the analysis, and the courts
must give a high degree of deference to the way the agency does it, so long
as no statutory components or directives are violated.
It is easier to state this dichotomy than to apply it, however, because the
court's frame of reference is always the statute by which the agency is
governed. If the statute requires the agency to make decisions that are
"economically feasible," for example, then a decision on feasibility is an
unavoidable component of judicial review. The court must assure itself
that the statutorily mandated decision about economic feasibility has been
made' and that the agency's reasoning was rational and supported by
evidence. An agency cannot immunize arbitrary or capricious substantive
decisions by dressing them up in the Emperor's clothes of economic
jargon. The court must also be cautious that the economic analysis takes
account of the factors that Congress intended to be considered, insofar as
Congress has made its intent clear."4 In looking at such factors, the court
varieties").
23. Even under the "limited" review of regulatory analyses envisioned in pending regulatory analy-
sis bills, see infra text accompanying notes 50-60, if an agency failed to do the analysis at all, the rule
"should in almost all cases be set aside for a failure to comply with statutory mandates." S. REP. No.
305, supra note 11, at 60; see 128 CONG. REC. S2390 (daily ed. March 18, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Laxalt).
24. Thus, economic feasibility can mean reasonable compliance cost to each individual company or
only to a class of companies, or survival of the industry, depending on the statute or even the particu-
lar section in the statute. Dolgin and Guilbert have discussed the various kinds of cost analyses con-
templated by different sections of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1976):
In short, the 1977 "best practicable" standard must be set in light of some type of cost-
benefit analysis while the 1983 "best available" level and the new source level must consider
cost in some unspecified other manner. The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments indi-
cates that the failure of the statute to be more specific on how cost is to be considered for the
1983 and new source levels was probably due to disagreement among the conferees. This disa-
greement shows up in conflicting statements by the House and Senate managers during the
floor debates on the Conference Report on the 1972 Amendments.
On the House side, the conferees stated that cost-benefit analysis was required even as to
new source standards, the only difference being that for the 1977 "best practicable" standard
"total costs," including "external costs" such a "potential unemployment, dislocation, and ru-
ral area economic development," must be considered, while for the new source standards only
"internal cost," i.e., "the cost of equipment," need be considered.
On the Senate side, however, the conferees' statement indicated that for new source effluent
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is construing the statute, and although agency interpretation has a role to
play in such constructions, the level of deference is not as high as that to
be accorded to the agency's choice of theories and methodologies for con-
ducting the analysis.
3. Economic Analysis Not Required By Statute
In situations where Congress has not specifically told the agency to as-
sess cost or other economic impacts, it may nonetheless rely on such analy-
sis as evidence to support more general policies. Here, courts may have a
lesser obligation to defer to the agency's analysis since it is being submit-
ted in lieu of other, more traditional evidence, and not at the direction of
Congress.
B. Agency Choice of Economic Theory
Often, the agency and the opposing litigants will rely on competing eco-
nomic theories. Courts should be careful not to conduct their reviews on
the basis of the comparative worth of different schools of economics. Pre-
sumably, unless Congress has indicated otherwise, the agency may deter-
mine to which theory it wishes to give credence. Thus, an agency decision
to fix rates on the basis of fully allocated costs rather than marginal costs
should ordinarily go unchecked."8 That choice goes with the political
territory."6
On the other hand, whatever their differences over the soundness of
particular policies, economists substantially agree on certain fundamentals
standards a "reasonable cost test" was intended, under which any available technology might
be required so long as the cost does not seem too high. Indeed, the Senate conferees made it
clear on the Senate floor that they had agreed only reluctantly to cost-benefit analysis for the
1977 standards, and they attempted in their floor statement to limit such analysis to a determi-
nation as to whether the benefits of the standards are "wholly out of proportion" to the costs of
achieving it. The Senate conferees went on to state that with reference to the 1983 "best
available" standard: "While cost should be a factor in the Administrator's judgment, no bal-
ancing test will be required."
This is one of the many situations in the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments where
the Senate and House managers made statements in the floor debates which they apparently
could not agree on at the conference.
E. DOLGIN & T. GUILBERT, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 696-97 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
25. See, e.g., Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981); cf. Columbia LNG Corp. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1973) (Com-
mission's requirement of incremental pricing for sale of imported gas invalidated as not based on
substantial evidence).
26. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Fourteenth
Amendment did not enact "Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" or any particular economic theory). All
judges may not agree, however. See Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221, 1236 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (FCC "has shown a serious misunderstanding of the nature of pricing
decisions in competitive markets," and "has embraced some fundamentally unsound economics," thus
acting arbitrarily and capriciously), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
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of microeconomic theory 7 : In the long run, supply must equal demand; in
a competitive 'market, an efficient operator will earn a reasonable return
on invested capital but no more; investors will seek to maximize profits;
and so on. If, after the careful factual inquiry advocated in part II, a
judge determines that the agency's analysis is inconsistent with basic
microeconomics and that the agency has not explained (perhaps because it
has not noticed) the discrepancy, the judge may properly conclude that the
agency action as arbitrary and capricious.' 8 This is not to say that an
agency cannot reject the prevailing economic wisdom, but courts can prop-
erly insist that the agency do so consciously and explain why it chose to
rely on an unorthodox theory.
C. "Hard Look" Review of the Record
Under present law, a reviewing court must determine whether an
agency finding of, say, economic feasibility is supported by "substantial
evidence," i.e., enough economic data for the judgment of feasibility to be
reasonable. Although in this area a court should probably accord a high
degree of deference to the agency's presumed expertise, courts still have a
statutory responsibility themselves to determine how much economic data
and supporting analysis-and what sorts-constitute "substantial
evidence.""
1. Computer Modeling
In several recent cases, agencies have offered as "substantial evidence"
the results of complicated models that use massive amounts of data about
seemingly innumerable variables to predict what will happen under dif-
ferent policy options. We can anticipate that the "proof" of economic
judgments will increasingly be served up in terms of these computer simu-
lations, regression analyses, and other data-based predictions of future
consequences rather than descriptions or analyses of past events. Of
course, since such models and simulations inevitably incorporate economic
theories of behavior, the court is really being asked to accept those theories
as well as the predicted results that follow from them as the "substantial
evidence" necessary to backstop agency choices.
27. See P. SAMUELSONi, ECONOMICS 789 (11th ed. 1980).
28. See, e.g., Aeron Marine Shipping Co. v. United States, 695 F.2d 567, 578-81 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(agency assumed that U.S. ships would be reasonably profitable despite their high fuel costs).
29. See Columbia LNG Corp. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1973) (rule invalidated for lack of
substantial evidence as to incremental pricing requirement); compare Vermont Yankee II, 685 F.2d at
490-94 (NRC applied proper standard of economic feasibility and cost estimates were correct) with id.
at 516 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (NRC's estimate of construction costs for nuclear reactor was arbi-
trary and capricious, as based on untenable assumption of indefinite public subsidy).
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The earlier discussion of deference to agency policy choices would then
apply. However, because the economic theory is buried in the computer
model rather than being explicit in the agency's explanation for its deci-
sion, the potential for overlooking instances where the agency has failed to
justify its key assumptions is enhanced, and the need for judges to ferret
out the underlying facts and circumstances is especially acute. The degree
to which courts can successfully address themselves to these models may
well be a hallmark of the efficacy and utility of future judicial review of
economic analyses.
Thus far, attempts by outside parties to challenge this futuristic ap-
proach by agency decisionmakers have not fared particularly well. The
environmental plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Costle,80 for example, argued
that an EPA-constructed econometric model forecasting power plant emis-
sions under alternative sulfur dioxide emission standards generated results
so "speculative" and "unreliable" that they could not qualify as substan-
tial evidence. The model was designed in aid of EPA's duty under section
111 (a)(1)(C) of the Clean Air Act to consider cost, energy, and health and
environmental factors in addition to air quality in determining the per-
centage reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions achievable by the best tech-
nological system of emission reducton. The model assessed total air emis-
sions, utility investment in new plant and pollution equipment, consumer
costs, energy production and consumption, coal use, utility consumption of
oil and natural gas, and the amount of western low-sulfur coal shipped
East.
The environmental plaintiffs challenged the model's focus on long-term
rather than short-term outcomes under various assumptions and on na-
tional and regional emissions rather than individual plant emissions. But
most important, they attacked its "cost-minimization" assumption, which
became the linchpin of EPA's rationale for the standard it adopted, i.e.,
that at a certain point, the higher cost of more restrictive emission re-
quirements for new power plants would retard rather than promote air
quality improvement because they would delay the retirement of older,
poorly controlled plants and their replacement by newer and cleaner ones.
The court in Sierra Club reviewed, for "internal consistency and rea-
sonableness," the assumptions underlying the proposed rule and EPA's
explanation for them, the methodology used in constructing the model,
and the agency's public responses to public comments received on the as-
sumptions. It concluded that "EPA's reliance on its model did not exceed
the bounds of its usefulness and that its conduct of the modeling exercise
30. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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was proper in all respects." '
In all candor, courts must be exceedingly careful that judicial review of
the type of sophisticated modeling involved in Sierra Club does not turn
into a rubber-stamping of the outcome chosen by the agency. Inevitably,
those who control the computer program and input have substantial ca-
pacity to manipulate the result."2 Courts start with a presumption in favor
of the agency."' The addition of advanced economic modeling techniques
built on the economic theories selected by the agency gives the agency a
decided edge on review that appellate courts and challengers are hard put
to override.3 4 Judges can easily become overwhelmed by the sheer number
of assumptions embedded in an economic model, the complexity of their
interrelationships, the possibility that some of the assumptions can be ex-
pressed or even understood only in quantitative terms, and the relation-
ships among the assumptions, the data fed into the model, and the results
emanating from the model. The task of review-at any level-can be a
daunting one indeed.
Yet, it seems inevitable to me that judges must review as evidence the
results generated by computers and econometric models-even if they oc-
casionally lose their way in equations, computer runs, and software pro-
gramming. A reviewing court can and must still examine the results of the
agency's simulation in order to ensure that the agency's conclusion actual-
ly flows from the computer's result. That final connection requires prima-
rily logic and legal skill, both of which are familiar home turf for judges.
A court must also look at the assumptions on which the model is based,
even if it does so deferentially because the assumptions are inextricably
tied to a particular economic theory. It can demand that the agency justify
its assumptions, although it cannot reject them simply because they are
controverted. At base, even the most intricate computerized economic
31. 657 F.2d at 334. But see B. ACKERMAN & W. HAMSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 81-103
(1981) (criticism of EPA cost-benefit analysis for "defin[ing] its mission in an extraordinarly narrow
way" in terms of environmental hazards, id. at 81, failing to recognize different required interests at
stake, examining too limited a range of policy alternatives, reflecting an unrealistic view of enforce-
ment, and using "a computer analysis rich in its discussion of costs but impoverished in its considera-
tion of the benefits that putatively justified all the activity." Id. at 84.).
32. If there is one thing that generalists comprehend about the Computer Age, it is the acronym
"GIGO"-garbage in, garbage out. In Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
however, we took reassurance from the fact that EPA too recognized the sensitivity of its model to "a
few key initial assumptions," and thus displayed "consciousness of the limits of its model."
33. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) ("Cer-
tainly, the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity."); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d at 334 ("EPA has the benefit of the presumption of good faith and regularity in agency
action.").
34. A court confronted by issues calling for economic analyses "can no more avoid the use of
economic models . . . than it can avoid speaking prose." Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Mod-
els in Antitrust: The RcaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994, 995 (1979).
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model is a series of steps in logic; a court can insist that the model's as-
sumptions be converted, to the best of the agency's ability, from impene-
trable mathematics to sentences in English. 5 While no substitute for a
Ph.D. in theoretical economics, such exercises can reveal, in a surprising
number of cases, gross errors6-or assumptions in the model that, while
acceptable under a particular school of economics, contradict specific indi-
cia of congressional intent with regard to the particular statute.37 Further-
more, the court can ask the agency for expert guidance as to the relation-
ship between the assumptions in the model and the raw data that fueled
it; critical gaps may be revealed in the agency's responses.
The aim is to demystify modeling; to demand that the agency make the
model's assumptions and workings understandable to a reviewing judge
who has the statutory duty of deciding if the model's predictions rise to
the level of "substantial evidence." This may take more time at oral argu-
ment or more pages in the brief, but it is essential to the utility of judicial
review in a high-tech era. The alternatives are unpalatable: Either review
will be perfunctory or administrative agency decisions involving economic
modeling will have to be sent to a specialized court.
35. It is well recognized in statistical analysis that a model is only so good as the theory underlying
the model. See Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 713-15
(1980). Thus, an appellate court's first step in reviewing an economic model is to assess whether it
makes any sense. For example, has the agency provided some reason to believe that certain variables
are dependent on other variables? A properly developed trial or rulemaking record may also help a
reviewing court locate weaknesses in a model that are not so readily apparent. For instance, the trial
record may demonstrate that the agency cast about for a statistical model by trying a range of equa-
tions without first searching for an appropriate theory. In such cases, a "good fit" between the model
and the data may simply be a "spurious" result. Id. Inquisitive trial or agency lawyers may also assist
reviewing courts by finding out what sort of analysis the agency did of the sensitivity of its model to
variations in the assumptions. Sensitivity analysis can indicate how reliable the model is, and therefore
to what extent the agency may properly rely on the model. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra
note 31, at 82 (discussing narrow sensitivity analysis conducted by modelers at EPA).
36. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 678 F.2d 327,
342-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (agency's economist calculated cost of servicing long-term debt at seven per-
cent during period of double-digit interest rates); San Antonio v. United States, 631 F.2d 831, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (seven percent additive above full costs set aside because figure used with no sup-
porting rationale or justification).
37. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 31, at 105 (for "agency forcing statutes," courts should
require the fullest possible agency investigation into competing policy approaches).
It should also be noted that the short-run economic costs or consequences of a particular policy may
be quite different from the long-run consequences, and that an analysis focused on one rather than the
other may produce quite different results. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 31, at
66-74 (criticizing EPA's sulfur dioxide regulations requiring "forced scrubbing" as failing to mini-
mize either short- or long-term costs since they ignore less expensive means of reducing emissions in
the short run and commit billions of dollars before potentially less costly long-term responses have
been researched and evaluated).
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2. Validating Economic Predictions
Most economic analyses are designed to make predictions about the fu-
ture; thus, there is no direct way to test their validity. But once a regula-
tory scheme has been in place for a few years, one can often evaluate it
and determine whether the earlier predictions were borne out. If the
agency then wants to rely on the same economic predictions in a similar
situation, a court may be able to insist that the agency first inquire, for
the record, into the success or failure of the predictions in the past.
In City of Charlottesville v. FERC,"8 a split FERC had permitted a
parent holding company to keep the tax savings from a consolidated re-
turn rather than allocating those savings to operating utility subsidiaries
so that the savings could be passed on to their customers. The agency
based its action on the economic theory that the parent would invest those
savings in exploration and development of new supply sources, which
would ultimately benefit the utilities and their customers. The dissenting
FERC members objected on the ground that FERC had been pursuing
this policy for years with no empirical evidence that parent companies
really were channeling the savings into research and development, instead
of just passing them through to their own shareholders. When the case
came up for judicial review, the panel majority remanded it back to the
FERC for lack of "evidentiary support for the proposition that [the
agency's rule] will directly result in such development [of new sup-
plies]." 9 The majority opinion pointed out that "there is no indication
that Columbia's exploration and development investments were any
greater after FERC's change in tax cost policy than before the supposed
incentive was created."40 In a separate concurrence I wrote:
Though this court in the past has approved agency use of predictive
economic models in place of actual costs in ratesetting cases, we have
always stressed that the agency must make "a conscientious effort to
take into account what is known as to past experience and what is
reasonably predictable about the future" to monitor whether the
model's assumptions work in practice. In this case, the agency has
made no attempt at all to verify the accuracy of its prediction that
granting pipeline affiliated producers tax incentives will spur in-
creased investment in research and development of natural gas sup-
plies, although according to its own estimate, it has either followed
or advocated following the challenged method of tax allocation for
38. 661 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
39. Id. at 951.
40. Id. at 953.
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seven years.'
However, the third member of the panel dissented, arguing that FERC,
in putting into effect an economic policy designed to bring about a legiti-
mate statutory end, was merely exercising its "predictive" policymaking
function, and that policy must be presumed to be valid if theoretically
sound.'2
Charlottesville typifies the problem reviewing courts may have in sort-
ing out what kinds, if any, of validating economic data are necessary in a
particular instance to support, under the "substantial evidence" test," a
decision based on an economic theory or model. But I believe that the
effort is necessary and will often prove fruitful. Agencies may otherwise
tend to gloss over past errors and insist that more of the same is the best
remedy. A reviewing court, by insisting on validation where appropriate,
can help keep the agency honest.
D. Balancing Economic Analysis Againct Non-Economic Conditions
Under some statutes, economic considerations are relevant but not de-
terminative bases for agency decisions. Economic factors may compete di-
rectly with such non-economic considerations as fairness, safety, health,
environment, or the survival of certain kinds of institutions. In such stat-
utes, Congress envisions a multifactored decisionmaking analysis by the
agency, with the initial balancing left to the agency but subject to review
by the courts." Cases that arise under statutes of this sort are the most
difficult cases, for they inevitably require the weighing of values that are
not comparable: for example, the safety of miners versus the risk that
mine-owners will cease operations if safety costs become too high, 5 or the
safety of automobile passengers versus the consequences for the automo-
41. Id. at 954-55 (Wald, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 958 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
43. Compare id. at 954 (majority remanded because FERC's policy choice was not based upon
substantial evidence in the record) with id. at 957 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) ("The 'facts' support-
ing a prediction of where the public interest lies are not susceptible to the same degree of proof as are
the facts supporting, say, a decision to revoke a license ... ").
44. Compare Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 331 (Congress expected EPA to balance pollution
control against possible adverse effects on coal market, impediments to long-term economic growth,
and inhibition of technological innovation) with American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 521 (1981) (Congress undertook its own cost-benefit analysis before enacting the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976), and "[n]owhere is there any
indication that Congress contemplated a different balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health
and safety against the costs of achieving them."). See also Note, Significant Risk and Feasibility-A
Paradigm for Interpreting Recent Supreme Court OSHA Decisions, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 537
(1982).
45. See, e.g, United Mine Workers v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 671 F.2d
615 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (miner representatives arc entitled to payment of wages for time spent accompa-
nying federal officers on "spot" inspections).
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tive industry of standards mandating the inclusion of expensive protective
devices in new cars."
Here the judge first looks to the statute-and its legislative history-for
evidence that Congress had preferences or left instructions as to how the
economic and non-economic considerations were to be balanced. These
forays through the legislative history sometimes produce inconclusive or
even contradictory results, 7 but, on other occasions, they can be extraordi-
narily helpful. 4" The judge then addresses the agency's rationale to ensure
that the agency considered the competing factors in a manner that is rea-
sonably close to that which Congress intended. If it has-and if the
agency's economic analysis itself passes muster, according to the criteria
discussed above-then the agency's decision will probably withstand judi-
cial scrutiny. The agency head who strikes the balance in the first instance
has substantial leeway under most balancing statutes to elevate or down-
play economic considerations as compared to other values protected by the
statute, or to probe any inherent shortcomings of various economic as-
sumptions, predictions, and logic.
It is possible, however, for a court to conclude from the statutory lan-
guage or history that the agency's economic analysis incorporates assump-
tions that are fundamentally at odds with a purpose or interest of the
drafters of the statute. In such cases, the court cannot allow the agency to
frustrate the legislative intent, and must order a fairer rebalancing.4'
46. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated sub noma. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856
(1983); cf S. REP. NO. 305, supra note 11, at 47 ("Most economists have recognized that the calcula-
tion and valuation of benefits present the most difficult problems in preparing a regulatory analysis.");
accord H.R. REP. NO. 435, supra note 11, at 43.
47. See, e.g, Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 677 F.2d 915, 923-26 (D.C. Cir.)
(legislative history of Staggers Act neither supported nor undercut petitioners' claim that railroad cost
index must reflect productivity increases), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 568 (1982). See generally Local
1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) (difficulties of
legislative interpretation); Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 83 (1974) (White, J.) (recognizing
existence of "'sheer inadvertence in the legislative process' ") (quoting Schmid v. United States, 436
F.2d 987, 992 (Ct. Cl. 1971)).
48. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. FERC, 676 F.2d 763, 775-77 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (legisla-
tive history of the Natural Gas Policy Act confirmed that Congress left compensation for curtailments
to commission's discretion); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 319-22 (legislative history of the Clean
Air Act demonstrated agency's authority to issue variable pollution standards).
49. See, e.g., American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir.) (overturning
FERC rules governing cogenerator facilities on the grounds that the rules were inconsistent with the
purpose of the legislation' under which they were promulgated), cert. granted sub nom. American
Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 206 (1983). But see id., 675 F.2d at 1247
(statement of Judges Wald and Mikva dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (FERC ade-
quately balanced conflicting statutory interests); Power Mites Locked in Big Battle, Wash. Post, Aug.
12, 1982, at Cl, col. 4 (Congress readdressing the cogeneration issue because court decisions setting
aside FERC rate orders resulted in financial institutions becoming wary of backing cogeneration
projects).
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IV. Proposals for Cost Analyses for Major Rules
The limited experience of courts thus far in reviewing economic analy-
ses could be expanded if pending measures on "regulatory reform" be-
come law. Ironically, the major bills would increase the number of cases
in which economic analyses would be presented for judicial consideration,
but, at the same time, they provide that judicial review of such analyses
would be even more limited than it is now.
Senate and House bills under current consideration require both a cost-
benefit analysis and a cost-effectiveness analysis for rules with major eco-
nomic, health, or welfare impact. 50 They expressly limit judicial review of
those analyses: Courts may not review the agency's determination that a
rule is or is not "major" so as to invoke the requirement51 and "[a]ny
regulatory analysis [required by the Senate bill] . . . shall not be subject
to judicial consideration separate or apart from review of the rule to
which it relates." 2 The Senate and House Reports are emphatic that
"Uludicial evaluation of the quality of these analyses would hamper
achievement of this goal [of better agency decisions], not promote it.""3
The bills do require that the analyses be made part of the rulemaking
record for the reviewing court's perusal.5 4 Thus, a reviewing court must
consider the content of the analysis together with all the other information
and rationales included in the rulemaking record in determining whether
the rule is supported by "substantial evidence." How this form of limited
review will work in practice deserves forethought. The House report says
that if the rest of the record is devoid of justification, the analyses may not
save it.56 The converse may be implicit, i.e., that if the rest of the record
fully justifies the rule, the deficiencies in the economic analysis, no matter
how severe, cannot jettison the rule. Yet the House report also acknowl-
edges that "[i]f the analyses are patently inconsistent with the agency's
explanation of the rule itself, the court may well ask whether the agency
has provided a reasoned explanation for its action in adopting the rule."'"
50. H.R. 746, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. sec. 101, §§ 622-624 (1982); S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. sec.
4, §§ 621-624 (1982) (as passed by Senate Mar. 24, 1982). See S. REP. No. 305, supra note 11, at 37
(Committee expects that only about one hundred rules a year will require a regulatory analysis).
51. See H.R. REP. NO. 435, supra note 11, at 49. S. 1080, supra note 50, sec. 4, § 623, permits a
very limited review.
52. S. 1080, supra note 50, sec. 4, § 623(d).
53. H. R. REP. NO. 435, supra note 11, at 49; see S. REP. No. 305, supra note 11, at 60-61.
54. H.R. 746, supra note 50, sec. 101, § 623; H.R. REP. No. 435, supra note 11, at 49, S. 1080,
supra note 50, sec. 4, § 623; S. REP. No. 305, supra note 11, at 59; S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 157 (1981); See also 128 CONG. REC. S2390 (daily ed. March 18, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Laxalt) ("The analysis may not be reviewed apart from the rule to which it relates, coming before a
court only as part of the whole rulemaking record.").
55. H.R. REP. NO. 435, supra note 11,at 49-50.
56. Id. at 50.
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This is a difficult trail for an appellate court to follow. The message to a
court seems to be: Read the analyses, determine the validity of the rule on
the record as a whole, evaluate its reasonableness in part by comparing
the analyses with other explanations in the record, but only in extreme
cases permit the content of the analyses to tilt your decision in favor of or
against the rule.
One of the Senate regulatory reform committee reports suggests more
strongly that serious defects in the analyses may provide a basis for refus-
ing to uphold the rule:
Where the party challenging the rule is able to identify inadequacies
in the regulatory analysis, the court must determine whether those
inadequacies are so serious as to warrant overturning the rule and
remanding it to the agency for the development of a more complete
record and the preparation of a more detailed analysis."'
At the same time, the Senate sponsors also envision a heightened defer-
ence to the agency's analysis, in the context of the entire record:
Courts should give substantial deference to agency assumptions and
conclusions in preparing the regulatory analysis. . . . This is espe-
cially important when dealing with inherently uncertain and ambig-
uous scientific assumptions and economic projections. . . . The
Committee intends that courts accord a substantial degree of defer-
ence to agency determinations in reviewing compliance with section
622 and not subject such determinations to the "hard look" applied
to other agency action. See, National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d
614, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1980)."
The Senate report seems to be saying that if the analyses are seriously
deficient on their face or if, considered in conjunction with the rest of the
record, they give rise to extremely troubling inconsistencies, the court may
decide that an otherwise acceptable rule is arbitrary. But the problems
with the analysis must be obvious-we should not look too hard for them.
Both reports raise perplexing questions about the scope of judicial re-
view of the new cost analyses. These bills, if they pass, will introduce a
new and even more deferential formula for judicial review of economic
analyses than exists now. But how impenetrable will the Chinese wall
around the analyses prove for judges? Obviously, if the rest of the record
57. S. REP. NO. 305, supra note 11, at 59; see also S. REP. No. 284, supra note 54, at 158 ("Dur-
ing its review of the entire administrative record, the court may find the discussion of the issues to be
addressed in the final regulatory analyses to be so lacking that these weaknesses taint the competence
of the entire record as a fair basis for the agency rulemaking.").
58. S. REP. No. 305, supra note 11, at 61.
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supports the rule, the regulatory analyses should change that result only if
they suggest such fundamental inconsistencies that a court cannot distill a
reasoned decisionmaking process from the~record as a whole. What should
be the result, however, if the cost factors are not treated elsewhere and if
their analyses are so deficient, even under a "not-so-hard look" standard,
that a court must conclude that the agency might have reached a different
decision if it had a valid cost analysis before it? And if there is some but
not enough evidence elsewhere in the record to uphold or defeat the rule,
how can a court avoid the determinative effect of the analyses? One odd
result may be a two-tiered level of review for economic analyses in the
same case: extra-deferential for analyses required under the new law; tra-
ditionally deferential for those the agency may ifi duce in the record as
part of its regular support case. That creates obvious incentives for the
agency to manipulate which is which.
In general, though, the requirement of cost-benefit and cost effectiveness
analyses should improve judicial review of rulemaking. Because the analy-
ses, along with the comments they generate, will be part of the record, the
courts will get not only more information but also an additional expres-
sion of agency balancing and reasoning." Also, heightened deference not-
withstanding, courts must still in the end appraise the reasonableness of
the analyses, the bases for the assumptions, and the inclusion of relevant
factors, in deciding what weight to give analyses, whether they are consis-
tent with the rest of the record, and whether they are so misconceived or
executed as to make a court conclude that the rule is arbitrary. Ironically,
the cost-benefit requirement under consideration could mean a greater not
a lesser role for courts in reviewing economic analyses."
V. Conclusion
Despite the risk that they can be used to produce smoke rather than
light, economic analyses are a welcome addition to agency decisionmaking
and administrative adjudication. Well-conceived, well-implemented,
and-most important-well-explained economic analyses or computer
59. Agencies may take greater care, because the analyses are in the record, to assure consistency
between the analyses and the rest of the record, thereby providing an additional incentive to coherent
rulemaking.
60. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Honorable Harold Leventhal stated:
We would be looking at a problem that was identified or that came to our attention by virtue
of material in the impact analysis, the regulatory analysis, without directly considering
whether the regulatory analysis makes a full and adequate cost calculation. I don't think the
matter is completely free from difficulties . . . and yet, I do see a basic line of division here
which seems to me to be one the courts can live with, and work out and handle.
Hearings on Regulatory Reform Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 14-
15 (1979).
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models can inform the court of consequences of the agency's action about
which it might otherwise have been unaware. The supplementary insights
offered by the discipline of economics should have intellectual appeal to
judges trained in the inductive, pragmatic, evidence-oriented legal process.
Agency actions must accord with congressional directives and be rea-
soned in a way that is comprehensible to reviewing courts. We cannot be
presented with a computer run or a series of mathematical equations as a
substitute for a rationale. The agency and not the courts must translate
the complex simulations and models into a layman's language, and ex-
plain adequately how it arrived at its result. Judges must be careful, how-
ever, not to become so enamored of the techniques of economic analysis
that they invent inappropriate uses or confuse form for substance. The
APA and various agency enabling statutes still command the field; due
deference to agency expertise must be given, but time-honored standards
of judicial review must also survive.
Private litigants can also be expected to raise increasingly sophisticated
criticisms concerning an agency's economic analysis or lack thereof, to
challenge the lack of record support for assumptions integral to a model or
the omission of relevant factors from the agency's analysis. Unfortunately,
these burdens may distance still further the affluent from the poorer liti-
gants in our legal system. Public interest economists must step forward to
assist legal services and public interest advocates who represent such
groups as consumers, environmentalists, and the poorer recipients of gov-
ernmental benefits. The gradual introduction of sophisticated economic
concepts and techniques into the system of administrative law offers great
promise for heightening the rationality of both agency behavior and judi-
cial review, but equally great caution is in order to insure that they never
be allowed to replace justice with cant, or to frustrate genuine judicial
understanding of what is involved in each dispute.
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